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ABSTRACT

On June 5, 2013, an article in the Guardian revealed
highly classified information about surveillance operations
being performed by the United States National Security
Administration (NSA). The source of this information was a
former NSA contractor named Edward Snowden. After arriving
in Moscow on June 23, Snowden spent the next forty days in the
transit area of Sheremetyevo InternationalAirport in a bizarre
state of geopolitical purgatory. Eventually, Russia granted
Snowden temporary asylum for one year, followed by a threeyear residency permit. This Note uses Snowden's circumstance
to consider the current state of internationalpolitical asylum
within the context of domestic whistleblower regimes. The
technological progress of the early twenty-first century has
enabled not only previously unimaginable intelligence-gathering
capabilities but also the capacity to instantaneously alert
countries throughout the world to the existence of such activities.
This Note addresses the resulting tension by recommending a
range of preventative measures and suggesting an evolution in
domestic applicationsof internationalasylum law.
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I. THE SNOWDEN AFFAIR
On June 5, 2013, the Guardian published an article under the
headline, "NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon
customers daily."' The article contained a copy of a classified order
from the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court).2
The order required telecommunications company Verizon Wireless to
provide the National Security Agency (NSA) certain metadata from
all of its customers' domestic phone calls from April 25, 2013, through
July 19, 2013.3 In the months following this disclosure, numerous
articles revealing further highly classified information about the
surveillance apparatus of the United States would appear in the
Guardian,Der Spiegel,4 Le Monde,5 and other media outlets. 6

1.
Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon
Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order/print
[http://perma.cc/ZS2E-2XF9]
(archived Sept. 14, 2014). The Guardian is a prominent UK newspaper with wide
readership, so such a dramatic headline is striking. See Josh Halliday, The Guardian
Reaches Nearly 9 Million Readers Across Print and Online, GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2012),
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/sep/12/guardian-9-million-readers-nrs.
[http://perma.cc/HS6E-AJYM] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (emphasizing the global reach
and readership of the Guardian).
2.
See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, FED. JUD. CTR.,
http://www.fj.gov/historyfhome.nsf/page/courts-special-fisc.html
(last visited Jan. 7,
2013) [http://perma.cclX7BW-ZGK4] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (stating that the FISA
Court is a "special court" established by Congress in 1978 "to review applications for
warrants related to national security investigations").
3.
Greenwald, supra note 1 (indicating that the order authorized the collection
of "the numbers of both parties . . . , location data, call duration, unique identifiers, and
the time and duration of all calls").
4.
See, e.g., Embassy Espionage: The NSA's Secret Spy Hub in Berlin, DER
SPIEGEL (Oct. 27, 2013, 7:02 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/internationallgermany/coverstory-how-nsa-spied-on-merkel-cell-phone-from-berlin-embassy-a-930205.html
[http://perma.cc/6SE8-UHC2] (archived Sept. 24, 2013) (discussing the NSA's
monitoring of German Chancellor Angela Merkel's cellular phone); Konrad Lischka &
Christian St6cker, 'Real Time'- New Leaks Show Near Total NSA Surveillance System,
DER SPIEGEL (Aug. 1, 2013, 4:24 PM), http://www.spiegel.delinternational/world/newnsa-leaks-describe-total-surveillance-system-xkeyscore-a-914244.html [http://perma.cc/
QB6H-4N3V] (archived Sept. 25, 2014) (describing the far reaches of XKeyscore, an
NSA surveillance program); Privacy Scandal: NSA Can Spy on Smart Phone Data,
DER SPIEGEL (Sept. 7, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/internationall
world/privacy-scandal-nsa-can-spy-on-smart-phone-data-a-920971.html [httpJ/perma.cc/
6Q7B-R825] (archived Sept. 25, 2014) (indicating that the NSA is able to access
information stored on smartphones). Der Spiegel is a "popular weekly news magazine[]
in Germany." Der Spiegel, UK-GERMAN CONNECTION, http//www.ukgermanconnection
.org/factfile-spiegel (last visited Aug. 31, 2014) [http://perma.cclM5C6-2PFQ] (archived
Sept. 14, 2014).
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The source of the classified national security information was a
former NSA contractor named Edward Snowden.7 On June 5, at the
time the initial article was published, Snowden had already
positioned himself beyond the direct reach of American authorities.8
On June 9, from a Hong Kong hotel room, Snowden revealed his
identity as the source behind the disclosure. 9 On June 21, the
Washington Post reported that U.S. federal prosecutors had brought
three criminal charges against Snowden: two charges under the 1917
Espionage Act and one charge of theft. 10 Fearing extradition,
Snowden flew to Moscow on June 23.11 For the next forty days,
Snowden stayed in the transit area of Sheremetyevo International
Airport in a bizarre state of geopolitical purgatory.1 2
During his time in both Hong Kong and the Sheremetyevo
Airport, Snowden submitted applications for asylum to over twenty
countries.13 Snowden's asylum requests were largely unsuccessful.
Countries either denied his claim outright or refused to consider his
application on procedural grounds.14 After June 21, the United States
5.
Le Monde is considered an influential French newspaper. See, e.g., The
Revolution at Le Monde, THE ECONOMIST, July 30, 2011, http://www.economist.com/
node/21524883 [http://perma.cc/39ND-JSQF] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (highlighting
anecdotal examples of Le Monde's influence).
6.
See, e.g., Timeline of Edward Snowden's Revelations, AL JAZEERA AM.,
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/multimedialtimeline-edward-snowdenrevelations.htm1 (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) [http://perma.cc/N8WR-UW4B] (archived
Sept. 22, 2014) (collecting articles related to disclosures by Edward Snowden).
7.
Glenn Greenwald, Ewen MacAskill, & Laura Poitras, Edward Snowden:
The Whistleblower Behind the NSA SurveillanceRevelations, GUARDIAN (June 9, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblowersurveillance [http://perma.cc/9HD9-2PMT] (archived Sept. 14, 2014).
8.
See id. (explaining that Edward Snowden left the United States for Hong
Kong on May 20, 2013).
9.
See id. (recounting the revelation of Edward Snowden's identity in a Hong
Kong hotel room).
10.
The two Espionage Act charges were "unauthorized communication of
national defense information" and "willful communication of classified communications
intelligence information to an unauthorized person." Peter Finn & Sari Horwtiz, U.S.
Charges Snowden with Espionage, WASH. POST (June 21, 2013), http://www
.washingtonpost.comlworld/national-securityus-charges-snowden-with-espionage/2013/
06/21/507497d8-dabl-I1e2-a016-92547bf094cc-story.html [http://perma.ccfYQ4U-LJDB]
(archived Sept. 14, 2014).
11.
See Lidia Kelly, Alissa De Carbonnel & Timothy Heritage, Russian Airport
Limbo Ends for Snowden, New Life Begins, REUTERS, Aug. 2, 2013, http://www.reuters
.com/article/20 13/08/02/us-usa-security-snowden-airport-idUSBRE97 10TZ20130802
[http://perma.cc/34TP-USVU] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (indicating that Snowden
arrived in Sheremetyevo on June 23).
12.
See id. (describing the nearly forty days Snowden spent hiding in the
Sheremetyevo International Airport).
13.
Nicole Gaouette, Snowden's Asylum Bid Spurned From Switzerland to
India, BLOOMBERG (July 2, 2013, 10:49 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0702/snowden-retracts-russian-asylum-request-as-refuge-options-narrow.html
[http://perma.cc/Q22-Z3G2] (archived Sept. 14, 2014).
14.
Many countries would not make a substantive judgment of Snowden's
asylum case unless he followed their required procedures of submitting an application
from within their countries or at their borders. See id. ("The Netherlands, Switzerland,

1170

VANDERBILT/OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 47-1167

suspended the validity of Snowden's travel documents.15 Although
Venezuela and Nicaragua offered Snowden asylum,16 this suspension
left him unable to arrange travel to either country. Eventually,
Russia granted Snowden temporary asylum for one year on August 1,
2013.17 Russia's decision sparked disappointment and anger from the
United States,' 8 and further strained diplomatic relations between
the two countries, which were already upset by the surveillance
disclosures.' 9
Snowden's saga highlights the potential dynamics at play where
an asylum applicant claims to be a political dissident. 20 Even though
there is a uniform international law of asylum, standardized law does
not necessarily lead to consistent application. 2 1 Individual countries
are responsible for interpreting and applying this uniform
international law within their own borders.2 2 Political considerations
inevitably affect asylum decisions. 23 For example, two Latin
American countries with relatively adversarial relationships toward
the United States offered full asylum to Snowden. 24 Because these
countries perceived Snowden a dissident, offering asylum
demonstrated political allegiance to his cause. 2 5

Spain, Norway, Ireland, and Austria said asylum applications are only considered
when made by people inside their territory or at their border.").
15.
See Kelly, De Carbonnel & Heritage, supra note 11 (reporting that
Snowden's passport had been revoked).
16.
William Neuman & David M. Herszenhorn, Venezuela Offers Asylum to
N.S.A. Leaker, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2013, at A7.
17.
Steven Lee Myers & Andrew E. Kramer, Defiant Russia Grants Snowden
Year's Asylum, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2013, at Al.
18.
Id.
19.
See id. (reporting that the United States was considering withdrawing from
a previously planned summit meeting scheduled for September 2013).
20.
See Greenwald, MacAskill & Poitras, supra note 7 (quoting Snowden as
saying he initially chose Hong Kong as a destination in part because of its "spirited
commitment to free speech and the right of political dissent").
21.
See UNHCR, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
Introductory Note by the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (July 28,
1951) 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter UNHCR Introductory Note],
http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html [http://perma.cclVP2U-DW3Q] (archived Sept.
19, 2014) (highlighting the inconsistencies between internationally acknowledged
asylum law and its varying interpretations among countries).
22.
See Max Fisher, Edward Snowden Could Strain to Qualify for Asylum
Under InternationalLaw, WASH. POST (June 10, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/worldviews/wp/20 13/06/1/edward-snowden-could-strain-to-qualify-for-asylumunder-international-law/ [http://perma.cc/Q2DJ-BFGX] (archived Sept. 14, 2014)
(showing the relative fluidity of international asylum law interpretation given
individual circumstances).
23.
See generally MATTHEW E. PRICE, RETHINKING ASYLUM: HISTORY, PURPOSE,
AND LIMITS 69-94 (2009) (discussing the significance of political considerations in
asylum determinations).
24.
See Neuman & Herszenhorn, supra note 15 (reporting that Venezuela and
Nicaragua offered Snowden asylum).
25.
See id. (outlining the political rationale behind Snowden's asylum offers
from Nicaragua and Venezuela).
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Russia is a more complicated case. At the time Snowden received
temporary asylum, Russia's relationship with the United States was
uneasy. The two countries had, in the recent past, displayed
disharmony one moment and cooperation the next. In April 2013
alone, the United States and Russia each banned from their countries
eighteen of the other's citizens for alleged human rights abuses. 26 The
countries later worked together through their intelligence services
after the Boston Marathon bombing.27 However, after Russia granted
Snowden temporary asylum for one year on August 1, 2013, the
United States-Russia relationship deteriorated to its least cooperative
level in decades.2 8 And so, as the one-year asylum term was set to
expire on August 1, 2014, Russia's reconsideration of Snowden's
status was reinforced with political considerations. 29 From this
adversarial posture, Russia granted Snowden a three-year residency
permit.30
This Note will explore international asylum law in the context of
proclaimed political whistleblower Edward Snowden. Part II

26.
Steve Gutterman, Russia Bars 18 Americans in Retaliation for Magnitsky
List, REUTERS (Apr. 13, 2013, 11:16 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/13/usrussia-usa-rights-idUSBRE93BOPU20130413 [http://perma.cc/G332-XHDB] (archived
Sept. 14, 2014) (describing how alleged human rights abuses led to a U.S. ban of
eighteen Russians from the United States and Russia's retaliatory ban of eighteen
Americans from Russia).
27.
Ellen Barry, After Boston Bombing, American Ties with Russia Improve,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/30/world/europe/
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2013),
[http://perma.cc/9M5U-F358]
after-bombing-american-ties-with-russia-improve.html
(archived Sept. 14, 2014) (reporting increased cooperation between U.S. and Russian
intelligence services after the Boston Marathon bombing).
28.
This was primarily due to the events surrounding Russia's annexation of
the Crimean region of Ukraine on March 18, 2014. See Michael Birnbaum, Russia
Grants Edward Snowden Residency for Three More Years, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russia-grants-edward-snowden-residencyfor-3-more-years/2014/08/07/8b257293-1c30-45fd-8464-8ed278d5341f story.htm
[http://perma.cc/CM96-C6RU] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) ("The decision last year to
grant asylum to Snowden for a year was a major factor in the souring of U.S.-Russian
relations, which have deteriorated to Cold War lows over the conflict in Ukraine."). See
generally Steven Lee Myers & Ellen Barry, Putin Reclaims Crimea for Russia and
Bitterly Denounces the West, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
(archived
2014/03/19/world/europe/ukraine.html? r=0 [http://perma.cc/XLL8-QYH4]
Sept. 14, 2014) (describing the increasing tension over Crimea between Russia and the
West).
See Birnbaum, supra note 28 (observing that "Russia ... granted
29.
...

Edward Snowden permission to remain in the country for three more years, . . . a

measure that promised to further strain U.S.-Russian relations"); Myers & Barry,
supra note 28 (indicating that, in addition to the grant of Snowden's asylum, relations
between the United States and Russia are strained by tension over Crimea); Myers &
Kramer, supra note 17 (reporting that, as of August 1, 2013, Russia had granted
Snowden asylum for one year).
See Birnbaum, supra note 28 (explaining that Russia gave Snowden
30.
"permission to remain in the country for three more years" and noting that, should
Snowden "extend his stay for one year beyond [August 1, 2017]," Snowden would be
eligible "potentially, to take up Russian citizenship").
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discusses the importance of classification to asylum considerations
and provides perspectives on the origins of asylum law. Part III
provides an overview of the modern state of international asylum law
as well as the various asylum laws and whistleblower protections of
the United States, Russia, and Iceland. Part IV offers solutions to
problems presented by political whistleblowers and is broken into
three parts. Subpart A argues that countries should foster more open
and frequent dialogue with one another so that the type of national
security operations revealed by Snowden are not necessary in the
first place. Subpart A also advocates for more unilateral disclosure of
information that would have previously been classified, effectively
discouraging whistleblowers by controlling the dissemination of
information rather than reacting to leaks. Both approaches seek to
eliminate any negative or potentially illegal behavior before the point
of disclosure. Subpart B recognizes that the solutions of subpart A
may be inadequate and difficult to verify. To address the difficult
circumstances that will nonetheless arise even if subpart A is
implemented, subpart B encourages countries use state policy, as
expressed through domestic whistleblower statutes, as a guidepost in
domestic implementation of international asylum law. Finally,
subpart C applies this Note's proposals to Snowden and concludes.

II. GENERAL ASYLUm BACKGROUND
Although the primary focus of this Note is the current state of
international political asylum, the general notion of asylum has
existed in some form for thousands of years.3 1 Examining the origins
and evolution of asylum law provides insight into the policy
considerations built into the present international asylum regime.3 2
Subpart A contextualizes the modern state of international asylum
law by exploring its history, while subpart B considers the impact of
whistleblower labeling.

A. HistoricalOrigins of Asylum
Asylum likely arose in connection with religion in ancient
civilizations. 33 Greece established a complex system of religious
asylum in its temples whereby criminals and noncriminals alike
could avoid apprehension by civil authorities and civilian pursuers in

31.
See generally S. PRAKASH SINHA, ASYLUM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-20
(1971) (outlining the historical background of international asylum law).
32.
See generally PRICE, supra note 23, at 24-58 (presenting an extensive
history of academic analysis of the goals and purposes of asylum).
33.
See SINHA, supra note 31, at 5 (describing the foundational philosophical
thought pertaining to the idea of asylum).
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a place where a deity resided out of respect for, and fear of retribution
from, the resident god.3 4 An asylum seeker would publically perform
an act of supplication in a temple,3 5 and the temple priest would then
determine whether to grant the supplicant asylum. 36 Foreign
supplicants granted asylum had a defense to extradition, as well as a
claim of immunity from pursuing authorities.37 However, granting
asylum could provoke displeasure and confrontation with the
foreigner's home state. 3 Leaders were therefore forced to make
practical political decisions as part of the asylum determination. 3 In
order to avoid unwanted repercussions while maintaining their
sovereign asylum traditions, Greece even intercepted some
potentially controversial foreigners before they could reach a
sanctuary to begin the asylum process. 40
As Rome seized power, asylum law evolved. In 22 CE, Rome
significantly curtailed the Greek system by stripping most temples of
their power to grant asylum.41 Rome implemented a less liberal
regime designed primarily to provide fugitives temporary reprieve
from immediate violence in order to gather evidence for a trial.4 2
Asylum law again evolved as the Roman Empire waned, taking on a
Christian influence. 43 Roman Emperor Constantine issued the Edict
of Toleration in 313 CE. 44 The Edit of Toleration allowed Christianity
to exist openly and formally recognized the power of the church to
grant asylum. 45 Where past asylum regimes protected innocent or

34.
See id. at 5-6, 8-9 (highlighting the religious foundation of asylum within
ancient Greek society).
35.
See PRICE, supra note 23, at 26-27 (explaining that "[supplication] was
initiated when a person entered a temple, sat in an altar, or held on to an image of a
god while grasping a broken twig or wool").
36.
See id. at 27 (noting that, to receive protection, the supplicant "had to
convince god's priest that they deserved protection").
37.
See id. at 28-29 (explaining that a foreign supplicant who was granted
asylum was "beyond the requesting city's authoritative reach" and "was given
immunity from the authority of those who pursued him").
38.
See id. at 30 (noting that "[a] decision to shelter a fugitive would be
interpreted as an affront to the foreign power and could sometimes precipitate war").
39.
See id. at 30-31 (illustrating the political dilemma Greek leaders faced
when confronted with a foreign fugitive).
40.
See id. at 31 (noting that Athens constructed "a police station near the
Acropolis . . . to intercept 'undesirable supplicants').

41.
See id. at 27 (indicating that the Romans stripped most temples of their
authority to grant asylum when the temples were unable to present "legal proof of their
right to grant asylum").
42.
See SINHA, supra note 31, at 9-10 (discussing changes the Romans made to
the asylum system after taking over Greece).
43.
See id. at 10 (highlighting the influence of Christianity on asylum law in
the Roman Empire).
44.
Id. at 10-11.
45.
See id. (noting that the "Edict of Toleration marked the beginning of the era
of allowing the churches to give protection to the fugitives").
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unfairly targeted fugitives, the primary aim of this church asylum
was to dispense divine mercy. 46
A far-reaching religious asylum regime persisted in most of
medieval Europe until the twelfth century.4 7 This regime fractured as
church officials increasingly claimed immunity for their criminal
activity, which strained public confidence. 4 8 Additionally, the rise of
nation-states produced civil authorities intent on controlling their
sovereign justice systems without church interference. 4
Governments placed significant restrictions on church asylum for
hundreds of years.5 0 England banned it altogether in 1625.51
Following the Reformation, European states implemented a
territorial asylum regime to cope with the large-scale displacement of
people fleeing violence between Protestants and Catholics. 52 This
regime emphasized that the right to grant or deny asylum existed
with the state; an individual had no inherent claim to asylum. 53 State
interest was a paramount consideration because the sovereign nation
controlled all facets of the asylum determination. 54 In recognition of a
transnational interest in administering justice and reducing crime,
most state leaders mutually agreed to deliver fugitive criminals to
their nations of origin as long as there was no government injustice.55
Although asylum was not typically granted to common criminals,
many states adopted a rule-the political offense exception-that

46.
Such mercy extended to the innocent as well as the guilty, in some cases
including intentional murderers. See PRICE, supra note 23, at 32-33 (describing the
Church's version of asylum as "a vehicle for mercy" that advocated "not only for the
wrongly accused, but for anyone who had been sentenced by Roman courts").
47.
See id. at 33 (explaining that, until the twelfth century, Christian asylum
was extended to a variety of individuals, including murderers).
48.
See id. (noting that members of the clergy often escaped harsh punishment
because they were "immune to secular authority" and received lesser punishments in
the ecclesiastical courts, which ultimately resulted in the death of Thomas Becket, the
Archbishop of Canterbury).
49.
See SINHA, supra note 31, at 12 (explaining that nation-states removed the
asylum power from the churches because they viewed asylum "as an institution created
by man and, therefore, within the competence of the state for regulation").
50.
See PRICE, supra note 23, at 34 ("On the Continent, Catholic kings tried to
persuade the Court of Rome to limit [church asylum] even further, and when Rome was
unresponsive, they abolished it themselves.").
51.
Id.; SINHA, supranote 31, at 15.
52.
See PRICE, supra note 23, at 34-35 (suggesting that the large numbers of
people crossing national borders in search of "refuge ... where their religion was
dominant" helped establish concepts of territorial sovereignty).
53.
See SINHA, supra note 31, at 18 (noting that following the Reformation "the
notion of asylum as a right of the fugitive yielded to the notion . .. that it was the right
of a state to either grant him the privilege of residence . . . or refuse to do so").
54.
See id. ("Th[e] right [to either grant a fugitive the privilege of residence
within its territory or refuse to do so] was to be exercised by the state in light of its own
interests and obligations as a representative of the social order.").
55.
See id. (recognizing that there existed "a general consensus of
opinion . . . that states must assist each other in the suppression of crime and that they
must not assure impunity to criminals unless their government has done injustice").
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individuals who committed political crimes would be granted asylum
and not be returned to their home countries. 56 In the nineteenth
century, the political offense exception became a principle of
customary international law through treaty. 57
The tradition of sovereign states having the capacity to regularly
interfere with a foreign state's attempts to dispense justice through
asylum could be viewed as evidence that political considerations are
at the historical core of asylum law and therefore should be respected
as part of the modern regime.58 In Rethinking Asylum, Matthew E.
Price notes that early asylum regimes in Greece involved political
considerations by civil authorities, even if the process was technically
the province of the temples. 59 These political considerations
continued, he argues, for the duration of church-controlled asylum as
well as after asylum transferred to sovereign states. 60 The political
offense exception to extradition, recognized as a principle of
international law in the nineteenth century, required a "categorical
judgment about the legitimacy of foreign governments." 6 ' Because the
enabling treaties did not enact a definition of "political offense,"
individual states were left to make value judgments concerning
acceptable government behavior. 62 The decision to grant asylum to a
political dissident, therefore, is an expression of the granting state's
political values.6 3
However, a number of factors have motivated asylum
determinations throughout history, and political considerations have
not always facially outweighed religious or humanitarian ones. 64 The
humanitarian conception of asylum is particularly strong where

See id. at 20 ("Even the least liberal states felt obliged to admit and respect
56.
the principle of political asylum.").
57.
Treaties containing this rule of political asylum include the Franco-Swiss
treaty of 1828 and the Belgo-French Extradition Treaty of 1834. ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN,
TERRITORIAL ASYLUM 4 (1980) (Belgo-French Extradition Treaty of 1834); SINHA, supra
note 31, at 20 (Franco-Swiss treaty of 1828). France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom
all publically supported this rule. See SINHA, supranote 31, at 20.
58.
See PRICE, supra note 23, at 57-58 (arguing for a political conception of
asylum rather than a humanitarian one in part because asylum has historically
included clearly political considerations).
59.
See id. at 30-31 (explaining that, in early Greek history, potential political
ramifications would heavily influence a decision to grant asylum).
60.
See generally id. at 31-51 (discussing the continuing influence of political
considerations in asylum decisions).
Id. at 49.
61.
62.
See id. at 51 (positing that "the definition of 'political offense' . . . was
rooted in value judgments about what counted as legitimate resistance to government
and legitimate punishment by government").
63.
See id. (noting that granting asylum for political offenses "often depended
in part on one's view of the regime against which resistance was directed" and,
therefore, a grant of asylum "advanced the cause of liberty by sheltering its partisans
from punishment").
64.
See, e.g., SINHA, supra note 31, at 9 ("[In Greece], the sanctity of the asylum
was generally observed as a custom, for the fear of the divinity.") (emphasis added).
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refugees seek safety from "core human rights" violations in their
home countries. 65 State interest has nonetheless remained presentwhether overtly political or under some other guise. 66
B. In Pursuit of Neutral Language
As a modern regime of international asylum law emerged in the
twentieth century, so did a robust and globalized media. 67
Heightened media scrutiny amplifies political considerations
surrounding proclaimed whistleblowers, particularly
where
underlying disclosures are controversial and transnational in scope. 68
Media descriptions of information disclosures can shape the debate
over appropriate remedies, often before the legal system even
considers actual asylum doctrine. 69 Labels are important because
they influence whether an individual is popularly considered a
whistleblower.70 Use of the term "whistleblower" can indicate public
opinion of a particular individual's actions.7 1 Because public attitudes
can shift depending on a number of factors, application of the
descriptor whistleblower can vary while the underlying activity
remains the same.7 2

65.
See Shalini Bhargava Ray, Optimal Asylum, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1215, 1222 (2014) (discussing the humanitarian purpose of asylum law).
66.
See PRICE, supra note 23, at 57 ("Asylum's focus on political morality [in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries] . . . was in harmony with the
ancient Greek practice . .. and it was also consistent with the general historical
function of asylum to immunize people who faced unjust punishment.").
See infra Part III.A (describing the modern international asylum regime).
67.
68.
See, e.g., Michael Calderon, AP Editor: Do Not Describe Edward Snowden
as a 'Whistleblower,' HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (June 10, 2013, 1:31 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-calderone/ap-snowden-whistleblower-b_3416380.html
[http://perma.ccl7ALD-P76C] (archived Sept. 11, 2014) (evaluating the appropriateness
of the term whistleblower and discussing its potential political implications). It follows
that countries are more acutely aware of political consequences when their actions are
closely monitored and documented.
69.
See MARK WORTH, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, WHISTLEBLOWING IN EUROPE 16
at
files.transparency.org/content/download/697/2995/file/
(2013),
available
2013_WhistleblowinginEuropeEN.pdf ("Given the power that the media has in
shaping public opinion, this shift [from seeing an information-discloser as a snitch or
informer to a public servant] can contribute to improving the image and perception of
whistleblowers."); cf. Ben Zimmer, The Epithet Nader Made Respectable, WALL ST. J.
(July 12, 2013, 8:01 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278
87323368704578596083294221030 [http://perma.cc/E277-YTL9] (archived Sept. 11,
2014) (describing the history of the term whistleblower).
70.
See Calderon, supra note 67 (acknowledging that usage of the term
whistleblower denotes a value judgment).
71.
See id. (asserting that whistleblower often carries more positive
connotations than "leaker" or "source").
72.
See, e.g., Editorial Board, Edward Snowden, Whistle-Blower, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 1, 2014) [hereinafter Editorial Board, Whistle-Blower], http://www.nytimes.com/
2014101/02/opinion/edward-snowden-whistle-blower.html
[http://perma.cc/EJX7-5MQM]
(archived Sept. 11, 2014) (exhibiting the conscious decision to change label use and
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Just as the tendency to label someone a whistleblower may
change over time, so has the underlying connotation of the descriptor
itself.73 The phrase "blowing the whistle" first emerged in the early
twentieth century, and its meaning was literal. 74 It meant the
cessation of an event, generally of a sporting nature. 75 By the 1930s,
the meaning of whistleblower had evolved to mean a person who
reveals information, though it often carried a negative connotation. 76
To be a whistleblower was to be a person who alerts authorities to
illicit activity. A whistleblower was a "rat" or "snitch."7 7 However,
since the 1970s, the term whistleblower has carried a nearly
universally positive connotation in the United States.78 A modern
definition of whistleblower specifies a "disclosure of corruption or
wrongdoing." 79 Because these negative terms are built into the
definition, usage of the whistleblower label usually indicates support
for the underlying disclosure.80
The media coverage of Edward Snowden demonstrates how
ideological perspectives inform labeling and indicate the preferred
approach to administering justice. 8 ' In Snowden media coverage, the
primary labeling distinction is between the supportive term
whistleblower and various neutral factual descriptions. 82 For
example, Amnesty International used supportive labeling early, 83

affix to Snowden the term whistleblower because his actions revealed wrongdoings by
the NSA to the American public).
73.
See Zimmer, supra note 68 (discussing changes in the perception of a
whistleblower throughout history).
Id.
74.
Id.
75.
76.
See id.
Id.
77.
78.
See id. (describing Ralph Nader's efforts to rehabilitate the word
whistleblower in the 1970s).
79.
Whistle-blower Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/
browse/whistleblower?s=t (last visited Sept. 27, 2014) [http://perma.cclRF9L-MXPV]
(archived Sept. 11, 2014).
80.
See id. (defining "whistle-blower" as "a person who informs on another or
makes public disclosure of corruption or wrongdoing").
81.
Cf. Calderon, supra note 67 (asserting that the label whistleblower often
suggests that the actor behaved justly).
82.
See, e.g., id. (urging AP writers not to use the term whistleblower to avoid
the appearance of support).
83.
See USA Must Not Persecute Whistleblower Edward Snowden, AMNESTY
INT'L
(July 2, 2013),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/usa-must-not-persecutewhistleblower-edward-snowden-2013-07-02
[http://perma.cc/6V5D-CR74]
(archived
Sept. 11, 2014) (referring to Snowden as a whistleblower in the opening statement of
the article).
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wire services have maintained neutral descriptions throughout,84 and
the New York Times has shifted over time.85
Amnesty International explicitly expressed support for Snowden
less than one month after he revealed his identity as the source of the
classified FISA Court order. 86 The organization insisted that
Snowden should be considered a whistleblower in a news item on its
website. 87 Amnesty International's director of law and policy
characterized the surveillance operations disclosed by Snowden as
"unlawful actions that violate human rights."8 8 As an ideologically
aligned advocacy organization, Amnesty International strongly
believed that no one-including Edward Snowden-should be
punished for identifying human rights violations.8 9
The Guardian'streatment of Snowden provides an example of a
traditional news outlet using whistleblower in a casually supportive
manner. 90 The paper repeatedly labeled Snowden a whistleblower
throughout its ongoing coverage of both his surveillance disclosures
as well as his personal plight. 9 ' Although the use of whistleblower in
a news story does not necessarily encourage an affirmative asylum
grant to a source of disclosed information, the standard implication
that the behavior of a whistleblower benefits society could indicate
84.

See, e.g., Mark Hosenball, U.S., Germany Discuss Intelligence Cooperation

After Merkel Affair, REUTERS (Nov. 8, 2013, 3:44 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2013/11/08/us-usa-germany-spying-idUSBRE9A710820131108 [http://perma.cc/UW4D7SRD] (archived Sept. 11, 2014) (referring to Snowden's leaks as "disclosures" and not
ascribing a label to Snowden).
Compare Editorial Board, Close the N.S.A.'s Back Doors, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
85.
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/22/opinion/sunday/close-the-nsas-back21,
doors.html [http://perma.cc/SM9R-HTB3] (archived Oct. 15, 2014) ("former N.S.A.
contractor"), and Editorial Board, Surveillance Goes on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/opinion/surveillance-goes-on-trial.html
[http://perma.cc/MGF5-Q634] (archived Oct. 15, 2014) ("disaffected N.S.A. contractor"),
with Editorial Board, Whistle-Blower, supra note 71 ("whistle-blower").
See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 82 ("The US authorities' relentless
86.
campaign to hunt down and block whistleblower Edward Snowden's attempts to seek
asylum is deplorable and amounts to a gross violation of his human rights.").
87.
See id. (insisting that Snowden's actions make him a whistleblower,
because he "disclosed issues of enormous public interest in the US and around the
world" and repeatedly referring to him as such).
88.
Id.
89.
See id. (arguing that disclosures of human rights violations "are protected
under the rights to information and freedom of expression").
See, e.g., Tom McCarthy, NSA Whistleblower Edward Snowden Says US
90.
5:18
PM),
1,
2013,
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
'Treats Dissent as Defection',
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/01/nsa-whistleblower-edward-snowdenletter-germany [http://perma.cc/YH8S-GTTE] (archived Sept. 11, 2014) (labeling Snowden
"[tihe NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden").
See, e.g., Ewen MacAskill & Julian Borger, New NSA Leaks Show How US
91.
Is Bugging its European Allies, GUARDIAN (June 30, 2013, 4:28 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/30/nsa-leaks-us-bugging-european-allies
[http://perma.cc/JM35-73UK] (archived Sept. 11, 2014) (referring to Snowden as "the
whistleblower Edward Snowden"); McCarthy, supra note 90 (applying the
whistleblower label to Snowden).
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popular support for applying the political offense exception. Thus, the
cooperative relationship between Snowden and the Guardian, which
traces back to the initial report on June 5, may inform popular
perception of his actions. 92
Media outlets that sought to withhold support from Snowden
attempted to describe Snowden's disclosures in neutral language.93
Tom Kent, then standards editor for the Associated Press (AP),
circulated a memo discussing use of the term whistleblower on June
10, only one day after Snowden revealed his identity as the source of
the classified information. 94 In order to avoid passing judgment as to
whether the disclosed activities constituted wrongdoing, Kent
recommended that the AP describe Snowden's behavior rather than
label him a whistleblower. 9 5 Fellow wire service Reuters followed a
similar path by factually describing Snowden's position, referring to
him as "former NSA contractor Edward Snowden."9 6
The manner in which the editorial board of the New York Times
treated Snowden demonstrates how perspectives and labeling can
shift over time.9 7 On June 11, 2013, only two days after Snowden
revealed his identity as the source of classified national security
information, the New York Times published an editorial titled
"Surveillance: Snowden Doesn't Rise to Traitor."98 In the immediate
wake of Snowden's revelation, the editorial board's posture was

92.
Greenwald, MacAskill & Poitras, supra note 7.
93.
See Calderon, supra note 67 ("But some news organization [sic] have been
less quick to describe Snowden as a 'whistleblower,' opting instead for terms like
'source' or 'leaker."'); Jim Heintz, Snowden Lawyer: Leaker Staying in Russia for Now,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 24, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/russian-state-newsagency-says-us-leaker-edward-snowden-has-documents-enter-russia [http://perma.cc/
S4K7-3TGS] (archived Oct. 15, 2014) (referring to "National Security Agency leaker
Edward Snowden"). While unsupportive media outlets generally used descriptive
rather than negative language, some individuals used directly negative terminology.
For instance, Secretary of State John Kerry referred to Snowden as a "coward" and a
"traitor" after Snowden's first television interview. See, e.g., Jonathan Topaz, John
Kerry: Edward Snowden a 'Coward... Traitor, POLITICO (May 28, 2014, 9:59 AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/05/edward-snowden-coward-john-kerry-msnbcinterview-nsa-107157.html?hp=14 [http://perma.cc/Z9C6-E4LL] (archived Sept. 11,
2014) (reporting Kerry's "response to [Snowden's] first television interview").
94.
See Calderon, supra note 67.
95.
Id.
96.
See, e.g., Hosenball, supra note 84 (describing Snowden's actions rather
than labeling Snowden).
97.
It is important to note that newspaper editorials are an accepted forum of
opinion journalism and therefore do not carry the objective weight of pure news
reporting. However, this instance is useful to the extent that it represents a clear
evolution in perception by a prominent segment of the media. Compare Editorial
Board, Whistle-Blower, supra note 72 (affixing the term "whistle-blower" to Snowden),
with Editorial Board, Snowden's Disclosures Do Not Amount to Treason, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 2013, at A26 [hereinafter Editorial Board, Not Treason] (arguing that
Snowden's actions did not make him a "traitor," but not yet using the term
whistleblower in his defense).
Editorial Board, Not Treason, supra note 97.
98.
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defensive against his most extreme critics but did not use
whistleblower. 9 9 After Snowden made further disclosures regarding
American surveillance activity, the editorial board adopted more
overtly supportive terminology. 0 0 "Edward Snowden, Whistleblower"
was published on January 1, 2014.101 In that article, the editorial
board unambiguously affixed Snowden with the whistleblower label
and also suggested the United States should grant him "some form of
clemency."' 0 2
The Sydney Morning Herald, an Australian newspaper, utilized
both labeling strategies in the same article. 0 3 In a headline reporting
Snowden's decision to seek temporary asylum in Russia, the paper
referred to him as a "security leaker," in the more factually
descriptive style of the AP and Reuters.104 However, the body of the
article begins by labeling him "US whistleblower Edward
Snowden." 105 This treatment indicates that the Sydney Morning
Herald may not consider the choice of language important, and
selected a phrase for its form rather than function. It may also
suggest that whistleblower is not as distinct in other countries as it is
in the United States, where the term's connotation is positive.106
Terminology used to describe proclaimed political dissidents is
merely a first impression of the public perception.' 0 7 Labeling is
important because it can help shape the popular debate, in turn
transforming the general public policy of a country over time.' 0 8

See id. (noting that Snowden "technically ... did not blow the whistle on
99.
fraud or criminal activity").
See Editorial Board, Whistle-Blower, supra note 72 (arguing that Snowden
100.
should be treated as a whistleblower).
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
See, e.g., Tom Parfitt, Security Leaker Snowden Opts for Russian Asylum,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Nov. 8, 2013, 11:27 AM), http://www.smh.com.au/world/
security-leaker-snowden-opts-for-russian-asylum-20130713-2pwxs.html [http://perma.ccl
BW6C-CUZ4] (archived Sept. 11, 2014) (describing Snowden as both a "security leaker"
and a whistleblower).
104.
Id. See generally Hosenball, supra note 84 (Reuters); Heintz, supra note 93

(AP).
105.
Id.
106.
Compare WORTH, supra note 69 at 19 (describing how the difficulty in
translating whistleblower to European languages has left citizens and media to use
synonyms of varying connotations) with Zimmer, supra note 69 (establishing the
current positive connotation of whistleblower in the United States).
107.
See Editorial Board, Not Treason, supra note 97 (displaying the initial
reaction of New York Times Editorial Board to Snowden's disclosure).
108.
See Calderon, supra note 68 (explaining that, because the term
whistleblower is positive, its application to a particular type of disclosure will
eventually indicate increased public support for the underlying activity).

2014]

GIMME SHEL TER: INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ASYLUM

1181

III. EXPLANATION OF CURRENT LAW
Media coverage ultimately has questionable bearing on a
particular state's consideration of an asylum application at the time it
occurs because countries rely on a combination of international and
domestic law for actual asylum determinations. 109 Established
parameters of international asylum law provide a framework for a
given country's asylum considerations.110 The ultimate decision on
whether to grant asylum is a sovereign prerogative, and so it depends
on a nationally unique comingling of international and domestic
laws.1"' Domestic laws are an expression of a country's public policy
and provide an opportunity to evince a state interest in transparency
through whistleblower protections." 2 Part III will first establish the
parameters of international asylum law before considering the
political postures of particular states based on their domestic refugee
and whistleblower regimes." 3
A. Modern InternationalAsylum Law
International law establishes clear requirements for individuals
seeking asylum. Under the Refugee Convention, one must prove (1) a
well-founded fear of persecution (2) for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a protected group, or political opinion (3)
and that the underlying activity did not constitute a serious
nonpolitical crime (4) or was contrary to UN principles. 114 Because
the decision whether to grant asylum is ultimately left to individual
countries, both domestic law and interpretations of international law
are relevant. 115 The resolution of this overlap in asylum law for
proclaimed whistleblowers will likely depend on domestic law, the
international political climate, and whistleblower protections of
individual countries.

109.
See DEP'T OF INT'L PROT., OFFICE OF THE UN HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES
(UNHCR), AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 62 (Aug. 1, 2005),
available at http://www.unher.org/3ae6bd5a0.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2014)
[http://perma.cc/6M8K-E6KE] (archived Sept. 11, 2014).
110.
See, e.g., Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. I, July 28,
1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention] (establishing
the definition, scope, and application of the term "refugee").
111.
DEP'T OF INT'L PROT., supra note 109, at 62 ("It is primarily the
responsibility of the government of a country to determine whether someone falls
within the applicable refugee definition within its jurisdiction.").
112.
See infra Part III.B.1-3 (discussing the whistleblower regimes of the
United States, Russia, and Iceland).
113.
See infra Part III.A-B (discussing modern international asylum law and
the domestic refugee and whistleblower laws of the United States, Russia, and
Iceland).
Refugee Convention, supra note 110, art. I(A), (F).
114.
DEP'T OF INT'L PROT., supra note 109, at 62.
115.
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The rights afforded to individuals in modern international
asylum law were first established in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), passed in 1949 by the UN General Assembly.
116 The UDHR is nonbinding but nonetheless carries enormous
weight and provides the basis for numerous binding agreements that
came afterward. 1 7 Article 14 of the UDHR states that "[e]veryone
has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution."" 8 However, Article 14 limits this right by stipulating
that it "may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely
arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations."" 9 Thus, the UDHR
establishes a dichotomy between persecution stemming from political
crimes and prosecution stemming from nonpolitical crimes. 120
In 1950, the UN General Assembly established the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).121 The
UNHCR interprets its mandate as to "Provide, on a nonpolitical and
humanitarian basis, international protection to refugees and to seek
permanent solutions for them." 122 The UNHCR describes
"international protection" as ensuring "admission to a country of
asylum, the grant of asylum and respect for ... fundamental human
rights, including the right not to be forcibly returned to a country
where ... safety or survival are threatened." 123 Although the
UNHCR's mandate ends only with the attainment of a "durable
solution," the UNHCR does not have the power to compel a state to
grant asylum.124 Likewise, an individual does not have a right to be
granted asylum.125

116.
See generally Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in National and InternationalLaw, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287
(1995) (describing how the UDHR has provided the basis for much national and
international law).
117.
See generally id. (discussing the influential weight of the UDHR in both
domestic and international laws).
118.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 14, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
119.
Id.
120.
See id. (declaring that the right to asylum without persecution does not
extend to nonpolitical crimes).
121.
About Us, UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, http://www.unhcr.org/
pages/49c3646c2.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2014) [http://perma.cc/J7RN-7ETT]
(archived Sept. 11, 2014).
122.
DEP'T OF INT'L PROT., supra note 109, at 7.
123.
Id.
124.
Id.; Riikka E. Morrill, Note, The Plight of the Persecuted: The European
Union and United States Asylum Law, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 87, 88 (2010)
("The UNHCR[] . . . relfies] on governments to work with the UNHCR to reduce
situations resulting in forced displacement of civilians and to collaborate with the
UNHCR to resettle refugees.") (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
125.
See Ray supra note 65, at 1221 ("Refugee law creates no right to be granted
asylum.") (footnote omitted).
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In 1951, shortly after passage of the UDHR, the United Nations
approved the Refugee Convention.126 The Refugee Convention is "the
centrepiece of international refugee protection today."127 It defines a
refugee as
any person who ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
28
protection of that country[.]1

The rights established in the Refugee Convention do not apply to
individuals who have "committed a serious non-political crime outside
the country of refuge prior to [their] admission to that country as a
refugee," or to individuals who are "guilty of acts contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations."1 29 Therefore, the
Refugee Convention tracks the UDHR's distinction between fear 'of
persecution for political crimes and fear of prosecution for nonpolitical
ones.130 The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee
Protocol) amended the Refugee Convention in 1967, essentially
removing the temporal and geographic limits of the Refugee
Convention and affirming its underlying principles.' 3 '
As mentioned in this subpart's introduction, there is no uniform
manner of parsing the difference between a political crime and a
nonpolitical crime in international law. Sovereign states are left to
make this distinction as part of their asylum determinations. 132
Because there is still no precise definition of a "political offense," one
could argue that the current system of international asylum law is
implicitly designed to encourage normative political judgments and
that states should embrace asylum as a political tool.133

126.

The 1951 Refugee Convention, UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,

http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49da0e466.html
(last
visited
Sept.
30,
2014)
[http://perma.cclNG5U-GXQV] (archived Sept. 30, 2014).
127.
UNHCR Introductory Note, supra note 21.
128.
Id. art. I(A)(2).
129.
Id. art. I(F)(b)
130.
Compare id. art I(F)(b), with Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
supra note 118, art. 14(2) (indicating that neither convention provides asylum for
nonpolitical crimes).
131.
UNHCR Introductory Note, supra note 21.
132.
See DEP'T OF INT'L PROT., supra note 109, at 62 (noting that individual
governments "determine whether someone falls within the applicable refugee definition
within its jurisdiction").
133.
See PRICE, supra note 23, at 57-58 (arguing for a political conception of
asylum rather than a humanitarian one in part because asylum has historically
included clearly political considerations).
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B. Domestic Laws and Whistleblower Protections
There are two particularly relevant areas of domestic law behind
political asylum determinations regarding information disclosures: (1)
general refugee law and (2) whistleblower protections. 134 While
seemingly neutral refugee statutes can be manipulated by a sovereign
state to avoid extradition in certain circumstances, enhanced
whistleblower protections built into the domestic code provide more
direct evidence of state policy.' 3 5
Subpart B briefly describes the domestic asylum laws and
whistleblower protections of the United States, Russia, and Iceland.
Snowden stated that his decision to flee to foreign jurisdictions before
publically revealing classified intelligence information was motivated
in part by the expectation that he would not be protected by the
existing U.S. whistleblower regime.1 36 Russia's domestic asylum law
is especially germane because its grant of temporary asylum and
subsequent issuance of a residence permit are Snowden's only
semblance of resolution. With almost nonexistent whistleblower
protections, Russia seems to have leveraged its domestic asylum law
to grant relief for at least partially political reasons. Iceland is widely
regarded as possessing a very strong state policy in favor of
whistleblowers and was also one of Snowden's initial preferred
destinations.13
1.

The United States 3 8

The United States is a signatory to the Refugee Protocol 3 9 and
expressed desire to comport with existing international asylum law

134.
See generally infra Part III.B.1-3 (comparing refugee and whistleblower
laws in the United States, Russia, and Iceland).
135.
See generally id.
136.
See Jacob Siegel, Edward Snowden: Not All Spying is Bad, DAILY BEAST
(Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/01/24/edward-snowden-notall-spying-is-bad.html
[http://perma.cc/6ZBW-LPNL]
(archived Sept. 13, 2014)
(claiming Snowden believed that he would not be protected under current
whistleblower protections and that whistleblower protections were inadequate in the
United States).
137.
See Greenwald, MacAskill & Poitras, supra note 7 (claiming that Snowden
viewed Iceland as "his best hope as the possibility of asylum" and noting that Iceland
has a "reputation of a champion of internet freedom").
138.
The United States is of particular relevance both as a global leader and as
Snowden's country of origin.
139.
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, STATE PARTIES TO THE 1951
CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL 4,

http://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.html
(last
visited
Sept.
29,
2014)
[http://perma.cclA7J6-QZYE] (archived Sept. 29, 2014). Though the United States has
not signed the Refugee Convention, it is nonetheless within the mainstream of
international asylum law because the Refugee Protocol reinforced the Convention's
underlying principles. See UNHCR Introductory Note, supranote 21.
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by directly incorporating the Protocol's definition of refugee in the
Refugee Act of 1980.140 Prior to passage of the Refugee Act of 1980,
the refugee law of the United States was essentially a series of
disconnected fixes implemented through immigration policy. 141
However, an intention to adopt the international asylum regime is
empty if the administration of domestic law diverges from that
intent.14 2 Between 2008 and 2011, U.S. immigration courts granted
31.8 percent of those applications that were not abandoned or
withdrawn. 143 Regardless of success rate, the Refugee Act codifies the
uncertain standard of accepting individuals with a well-grounded fear
of persecution for political crimes. 144
Various levels of government in the United States have passed a
45
large number of laws establishing whistleblower protections.1 In
addition to measures enacted by individual states, the federal
government has passed almost sixty statutes with some
whistleblower protections.146 These statutes span the public and
private sector, reach many different disciplines, and establish a
potentially unclear framework for whistleblowers themselves. 147
While a comprehensive discussion of these protections is beyond the

See Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A
140.
Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 77-78 (1981-82)
(stating that, "by adopting the Refugee Act of 1980," the United States adopted "the
definition of 'refugee' [as] contained in the Protocol").
See id. at 12-13 (characterizing the state of refugee law in the United
141.
States after World War II until serious reform efforts began in the 1970s).
See id. at 78 (providing that it is "incumbent on the executive branch to
142.
make good our intention to comply with international standards").
The Statistical Year Book for 2011 includes a yearly breakdown of asylum
143.
completions by disposition from 2007 through 2011. I first added the total number of
asylum grants for the years 2008 through 2011 (Figure 1, totaling 42,602 grants). I
then added the total number of asylum cases, less those that were abandoned or
withdrawn (Figure 2, totaling 133,764 cases). Finally, I divided Figure 1 by Figure 2
(42,602 grants/133,764 cases) to arrive at 31.8 percent. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., EXEC.
OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REV., FY 2011 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK K3 (2012),
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fyllsyb.pdf [http://perma.cc/6FY5-V6SA] (archived
Sept. 27, 2014).
See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, sec. 201(a)(42), 94 Stat. 102,
144.
102 (1980) (amending the Immigration Nationality Act to add a definition of refugee
that includes those "who ha[ve] a well-founded fear of persecution"). Because the U.S.
standard mirrors the ambiguous language in international law, it is particularly useful
to examine whether potential whistleblower protections in the United States reveal a
public policy on political crimes.
See Dana L. Gold, Introduction: Speaking Up for Justice, Suffering
145.
Injustice: Whistleblower Protection and the Need for Reform, 11 SEATTLE J. Soc. JusT.
555, 560 (2012) (noting that whistleblowers in the United States are protected by "a
patchwork of federal, state, and local laws with holes through which it is too easy to
fall").
146.
See id. ("On the federal level alone, there are nearly sixty statutes that
contain provisions intended to protect and provide redress for whistleblowers.").
See id. ("This patchwork of protections makes whistleblower law an
147.
amalgamation of many legal disciplines, . . . a fascinating area for both practitioners
and scholars, but a confusing and vulnerable landscape for whistleblowers.").
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scope of this Note, some commentators have noted that, despite the
breadth of coverage, the tendency of these protections to focus on
anti-retaliation measures has historically left whistleblowers
substantively unprotected. 148
At least regarding private employees in the financial sector, the
United States has recently demonstrated enhanced interest in
protecting whistleblowers. In particular, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (SOX) 149 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 150 contain significantly greater
whistleblower incentives and protections than simple anti-retaliation
measures. Though it has not been as successful as anticipated in
curbing corporate abuses, SOX signals support for whistleblowers by
providing procedural protections, covering a broad range of
disclosures and employees, and supplying a reduced burden of proof
for retaliation claims. 151 In addition to further broadening the
protections established by SOX, Dodd-Frank strongly incentivizes
disclosures of wrongful activity by allowing the whistleblower to keep
10 to 30 percent of the monetary penalty assessed to the wrongdoer
for the particular action, pending certain procedures and
limitations. 152
While SOX and Dodd-Frank contain clear policy choices to
support and incentivize private-sector corporate whistleblowers, the
United States has also updated protections for public-sector
employees. 153 Passed in 1989, the Whistleblower Protection Act
(WPA) is the primary statute covering federal workers.154 Congress
has recently updated what was widely considered to be an insufficient

148.
See Terry Morehead Dworkin & A.J. Brown, The Money or the Media?
Lessons From ContrastingDevelopments in US and Australian Whistleblowing Laws,
11 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 653, 657-58 (2012) (arguing that "this public sector antiretaliation model, [in addition to the private-sector model], has generally proved
unsuccessful in spurring whistleblowing or protecting whistleblowers").
149.
See Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Whistleblower Provisions:Ten Years
Later, 64 S.C. L. REV. 1, 5-21 (2012) (describing the additional protections provided by
Sarbanes-Oxley and finding that "[i]n many ways, Sarbanes-Oxley represents a great
leap forward for whistleblowers in the United States").
150.
See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank] (providing additional protections
and incentives to whistleblowers).
151.
See Moberly, supra note 149, at 7-9 (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley "include[s]
a broad range of whistleblower disclosures" and provides "burdens of proof and
procedural protections" that favor the whistleblower).
152.
See Dodd-Frank, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 at sec. 748(b)(1)(A)-(B) (providing that
whistleblowers are entitled to 10 to 30 percent of the collected monetary sanctions
imposed as a result of the whistleblower's action).
153.
See JON 0. SHIMABUKURO & L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R42727, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS UNDER FEDERAL LAW: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2012),
available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mise/R42727.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2014)
[http://perma.cclR2TK-98WE] (archived Sept. 27, 2014) (describing how Congress has
enhanced whistleblower protections for Federal employees).
154.
See id. (noting that the WPA, enacted in 1989, covers federal employees).
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protection scheme 155 with the passage of the Whistleblower
Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA). 156 To qualify for
protection under the WPA, a circumstance must contain (1) a
personnel action, (2) a protected disclosure, and (3) a covered
employee.1 57 The WPEA broadened the protected disclosure prong
and strengthened the procedures available during and after a
disclosure, among other things. 58
However, the statutory definition of a covered employee under
the WPA excludes many national security agencies, 159 and the
President may remove whistleblower rights at his discretion for
employees of any agency "the principal function of which is the
conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities." 160
The WPA explicitly excludes employees of the NSA, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence
Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Geospatial
Intelligence Agency, and Office of the Director of National
Intelligence. 161 Regarding the president's discretionary exclusion
power, the WPEA did enhance whistleblower protections by requiring
"the determination be made prior to a personnel action."162
While the WPA does not generally protect members of the
intelligence community, there is a federal statute that may protect
certain
under
information
of classified
disclosure
the
circumstances. 163 The Intelligence Community Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1998 (ICWPA) provides some procedures for
intelligence agency employees to divulge confidential information of
"urgent concern" to the Inspector General of their respective
executive agencies or a member of a congressional intelligence

See Dworkin & Brown, supra note 148, at 656-57 (indicating that "the
155.
approach has been spectacularly unsuccessful in protecting whistleblowers").
See id. at 658 (asserting that the passage of the WPEA may lead to greater
156.
success in the future).
157.
See SHIMABUKURO & WHITAKER, supra note 153, at 15 ("In order to trigger
the protections of the WPA, a case must contain the following elements: a 'personnel
action' that was taken because of a 'protected disclosure' made by a 'covered
employee."').
158.
See Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act Summary of Reforms,
PROJECT ON GOV'T OVERSIGHT (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.pogo.org/our-work/resourcepages/2012/20120917-whistleblower-protection-enhancement-act.html [http://perma.cc/
CG9C-RLMC] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (listing the aspects of the Whistleblower
Protection Enhancement Act that expand protective coverage and support fair
procedures).
159.
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii)(I) (2013) (providing an exception to
coverage for select intelligence agencies).
Id. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii)(II).
160.
161.
Id. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii)(I).
162.
Id. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii)(II).
163.
See id. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii)(I)-(II) (providing exceptions to coverage for
certain intelligence agencies).
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committee. 164 However, the ICWPA mandates a narrow reporting
procedure and does not even contain a retaliation provision. 165 These
limitations indicate the ICWPA may not actually result in meaningful
oversight. 166 Some intelligence agency employees have argued for an
overhaul of the intelligence community whistleblower scheme.' 6 7
In an apparent effort to address some of the gaps in protection
for members of the intelligence community remaining after the
WPEA and ICWPA, President Obama signed Presidential Policy
Directive 19 on October 10, 2012. 168 Among other things, this
executive order contains an anti-retaliation provision for employees of
the agencies explicitly excluded from the WPA.169 However, the order
also contains a general provision that it does not create any
enforceable substantive or procedural right. 170 The purely executive
nature of such orders is perhaps a less persuasive indicator of state
interest than statutes that undergo constitutional bicameralism and
presentment requirements.17 1
There have been concrete steps in the United States to codify the
types of protections established in President Obama's executive order.
On November 5, 2013, by a vote of thirteen to two, the Senate
Intelligence Committee recommended passage of a 2014 intelligence
appropriations bill that would strengthen whistleblower protections
for employees of intelligence agencies.172 On July 7, 2014, President

164.
See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105272, sec. 702(a)(5)(A), 112 Stat. 2396, (1998) ("An employee of the Agency. . . may
report such complaint or information to the Inspector General.").
165.
See id., sec. 702 (outlining the reporting procedure); Stephen I. Vladeck,

The Espionage Act and National Security Whistleblowing After Garcetti, 57 AM. U. L.
REV. 1531, 1545 (2008) (arguing that the procedure "leaves countless federal employees
unprotected").
166.
See Viadeck, supra note 165, at 1545-46 (casting doubt on the effectiveness
of disclosure under the WPA or ICWPA).
167.
See id. at 1545 (noting that intelligence agency employees have continued
to push for further whistleblower protection).
168.
See Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-19 at 1-3 (2012), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-19.pdf
[http://perma.cc/D2XT-5FK9] (archived
Sept. 14, 2014) (prohibiting retaliation against whistleblowers).
169.
See id. at 2 (providing protection from retaliation for employees of
intelligence agencies).
170.
See id. at 8 (indicating that "[t]his directive is not intended to, and does not,
create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural").
171.
See John C. Duncan, Jr., A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders:
Glimmerings of Autopoiesis in the Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REV. 333, 345 (2010) ("[T]he
executive order inherently carries the force of law with no requirement for
congressional approval, which renders it available for abuse.").
172.
See DIANNE FEINSTEIN, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2014, S. REP. No. 113-120, tit. VI § 601, tit. VII, at Committee Action (2013),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2013_rptssci-2014.html [http://perma.cc/
7WZ8-SGF6] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (documenting the Senate Intelligence
Committee's vote to recommend the creation of "a new Section 2303A of Title 5 of the
United States Code" that would protect intelligence employees from retaliation for
whistleblowing).

GIMME SHELTER: INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ASYLUM

2014/

1189

Obama signed the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2014, which includes provisions barring retaliation against employees
within the intelligence community who make protected disclosures,
as well as some procedural safeguards. 73 However, members of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation are explicitly excluded from coverage
under the Act. 174 The Act further does not apply to terminated
employees in certain circumstances, including where an agency head
notifies congressional intelligence committees of the firing within
thirty days. 175 While passage of this Act signals strong state interest
in whistleblower protections for members of the intelligence
community, conclusions regarding the efficacy of the Act should be
withheld until there is more time to observe its implementation. 176
2.

Russia

On February 2, 1993, the Russian Federation signed both the
Refugee Convention and the Refugee Protocol, bringing the country
into accord with modern international asylum law.' 7 7 This includes
the international definition of refugee, with its unclear distinctions
between persecution and prosecution.' 7 8 Shortly after ratifying the
Refugee Convention, the Russian Federation addressed asylum
through both domestic statutes and its constitution.1 7 9
Adopted on December 12, 1993, two articles of the Russian
Constitution of 1993 (Russian Constitution) explicitly reference
asylum, while two more bear directly on the issue. 180 Article 63 of the
Russian Constitution guarantees a right of political asylum to
foreigners "according to the universally recognized norms of
international law," as well as those who have been "persecuted for
political convictions."181 This language is ostensibly deferential to

173.
See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113126, sec. 601, § 3234(b), 128 Stat. 1390, 1415 (2014) ("Any employee of an agency who
has authority to take ...

any personnel action ...

shall not . . . take ...

a personnel

action with respect to any employee of a covered intelligence community element as a
reprisal for a lawful disclosure of information . . . ."); id. sec. 602, § 3341()(4)-(6), at
1418-19 (describing required agency adjudication procedures and stipulating that
judicial review is not available).
174.
Id. at sec. 604, § 3234(a)(2), at 1421.
175.
See id. at sec. 604, § 3234(d)(1)-(2), at 1421-22 (detailing how the Act does
not apply to certain terminations).
176.
See generally id.
177.
UNHCR, supra note 139, at 4.
178.
See Refugee Convention, supra note 110, art. I (defining refugee according
to international norms).
179.
See KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION]
art. 63 (Russ.) (stating that "[tihe Russian Federation shall grant political asylum to
foreign nationals and stateless persons according to the universally recognized norms
of international law").
180.
See generally id. arts. 15, 62, 63, 89.
181.
Id. art. 63(2).
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international asylum law, both through general reference to norm
compliance and by specifically incorporating the internationally
recognized political persecution requirement. 182 However, the
Russian President has apparent superseding authority over Article
63's directives. Article 89 states that the president "shall decide on
issues of citizenship of the Russian Federation and of granting
political asylum."' 8 3 It is not difficult to imagine such substantial
executive authority being utilized outside of international norms
where the issue is of particular significance to the country as a whole
or to the president individually.
Despite excluding the term "asylum" from the text, two further
Articles are particularly relevant to Russia's domestic asylum law.
Article 62 extends to "stateless persons" rights and obligations
equivalent to a Russian citizen, except as contravened by federal law
or international treaty.184 The terminology of Article 62's stateless
persons indicates an intention to separate the realms of asylum law
for displaced migrants and those seeking political asylum. 185
However, there will always be significant overlap between those with
traditional migratory claims and those seeking political asylum.186
Political persecution is often a driving force behind displacement.
Article 15 states that the rules of an international agreement will
predominate in any conflict with domestic Russian law.' 87 Therefore,
because Russia is a signatory to the Refugee Convention, the
Convention should prevail in any dispute with domestic asylum
law.' 8 8
Domestic Russian asylum law largely reflects the ostensible
acceptance of international law in the Russian Constitution and is
divided into three categories: political asylum, refugee status, and
temporary asylum.' 8 9 As established in the Russian Constitution, the

182.
See Refugee Convention, supra note 110, art. I.
KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION]
183.
art. 89(a) (Russ.).
184.
Id. art. 62(3).
See id. 62(3), 63(2) (using different language to describe displaced migrants
185.
and political asylum).
186.
Thomas K. Bauer, John P. Haisken-DeNew & Christoph M. Schmidt,
InternationalLabour Migration, Economic Growth and Labour Markets: The Current
State of Affairs, in THE NEW DEMOGRAPHIC REGIME: POPULATION CHALLENGES AND
POLIcY RESPONSES 111, 114-15 (U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Eur. & U.N. Population Fund
eds.), U.N. Sales No. E.05.II.E.10 (2005) (explaining that "it may be unclear from the
viewpoint of the receiving [country] whether to classify an asylum seeker or refugee as
a humanitarian or economic migrant" because the decision to migrate is based on
numerous factors).
KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art.
187.
15(4) (Russ.).
Id.; UNHCR, supra note 139, at 4.
188.
See Vladimir Mukomel, Asylum: The Russian Federation, CARIM-EAST
189.
(2011), http://www.carim-east.eulmedia/sociopol module/RFAsylum EN Mukomel.pdf
[http://perma.cclYV5R-64FR] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (noting that Russian law grants
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grant of political asylum is within the discretion of the president. 9 0
However, stateless persons rarely officially seek this designation;
there were only fourteen applications for political asylum between
2008 and 2013.191
There is more statutory authority regarding refugee status and
temporary asylum. 192 The primary source for both categories of
refugee law is the 1997 Law on Refugees, which amended an earlier
version of the law passed in 1993.193 Although the Law on Refugees
essentially adopts the Refugee Convention definition of refugee in
form, 194 it diverges from international law in ways that are
detrimental to applicants.' 9 5 For instance, there are broad grounds
for substantive denial, and there is no explicit guarantee of "nonrefoulement" in the Russian law.196 Whatever protections are written
into the law often suffer from arbitrary and harsh implementation by
Russian officials.' 9 7 The restrictive nature of the Law on Refugees is
further revealed by the very low success rate of applicants. 198
Between 2008 and 2011, only 7.7 percent of applicants were
recognized as refugees. 99
The Law on Refugees also provides procedures for granting
temporary asylum, largely similar to the general refugee procedure
but for a limited duration of one year. 20 0 However, there is an
additional provision allowing those stateless persons not qualifying as
asylum protection in three forms: refugee status, temporary asylum, and political
asylum).
190.
See KONSTITUTSIiA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION]
art. 89(a) (Russ.) ("The President of the Russian Federation shall: ... solve the issues
of citizenship of the Russian Federation and of granting political asylum.").
191.
Official Statistics: Asylum,
FMS OF RUSSIA (Apr. 4, 2013),
http://translate.google.com/translate?sl=ru&tl=en&js=n&prev=_t&hl=en&ie=UTF8&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fms.gov.ru%2Fabout%2Fstatistics%2Fdata%2Fdetails%2
F52086%2F [http://perma.cc/TR96-T8KR (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (using an English
language translation of a Russian government website).
192.
See, e.g., Federal'nyi Zakon RF o Bezhentsy [Federal Law of the Russian
Federation
on Refugees],
Feb.
19,
1993,
No.
4258-1,
available at
http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/3986
[http://perma.cc/G62LE7T2] (archived Sept. 14, 2014).
193.
See generally id. (incorporating subsequent amendments).
194.
See id. pmbl., art. 1(1) (identifying and defining the various categories of
refugees recognized under the Law of the Russian Federation on Refugees).
195.
See Ahoura Afshar, Refugees in Russia: The Law on Refugees and Its
Implementation, 18 J. REFUGEE STUD. 468, 471-72 (2005) (discussing differences
between the 1997 Law on Refugees and the Refugee Convention).
196.
See id. at 473 ("There is no clear and explicit provision that prohibits
refoulement of refugees.").
197.
See id. at 478-79 ("[B]ecause access to the [application] procedure is not
granted as a right . . . the authorities are not concerned with ensuring that the
procedure is fair and accessible.").
198.
Official Statistics:Asylum, FMS OF RUSSIA, supra note 191.
199.
Id.
200.
See Federal'nyi Zakon RF o Bezhentsy [Federal Law of the Russian
Federation on Refugees], Feb. 19, 1993, No. 4258-1, art. 12 (defining the process
through which a refugee may be granted temporary refugee status).
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a refugee under Russian law to nonetheless attain temporary asylum
if Russia chooses not to deport for "humane motives." 201 The
temporary asylum system is much more accommodating, granting 56
percent of applications from 2008 to 2011.202
Russia does not exhibit a state interest in transparency through
its domestic law, as its whistleblower protections are widely regarded
as weak or nonexistent. Russia fares very poorly in Transparency
International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI), a yearly measure
of perceived public sector corruption. 203 The CPI indicates that
Russia has a serious corruption problem and ranked the country
127th out of 177 countries and territories in 2013.204 That there are
no specific whistleblower protections in Russian law is directly tied to
the widespread corruption. 205 In April 2013, Russian President
Vladimir Putin signed a decree to provide government aid to those
who expose corruption, but only if the whistleblower was persecuted
or pressured or has a lawsuit filed against them. 206 However, Russia
would need to undertake a considerable overhaul of its anticorruption
laws to provide any type of meaningful protection for
whistleblowers.207

There is pressure on Russia for significant reforms in order to
convince companies to bring business within its borders and grow the
economy. 208 These economic pressures could reasonably lead to
illustrations of Russian state interest in curbing the appearance of
corruption though legislation and further presidential decrees. But
disclosing corruption for economic benefit is altogether separate from

201.
See id. art. 12(2)(2) (indicating that Russia may grant temporary refugee
status to those who "have no grounds for the recognition as refugees due to the
circumstances, provided for by the Federal Law, but cannot be deported beyond the
territory of the Russian Federation from humane motives").
202.
Official Statistics:Asylum, FMS OF RUSSIA, supra note 191.
203.

See

Corruption

Perceptions

Index

(2013),

TRANSPARENCY

INT'L,

2014)
Sept.
30,
(last
visited
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi
[http://perma.cc/P255-RCQ9] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (showing Russia's Corruption
Perceptions Index to be 28, with a score of 0 being the most corrupt and a score of 100
being least corrupt).
204.
See id.
205.
See OECD, RUSSIA MODERNISING THE ECONOMY, BETTER POLICIES SER. 25
(Apr. 2013), available at http://www.oecd.org/russia/Russia-Modernising-the-EconomyEN.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2014) [http://perma.cc/AK2Z-FPHT] (archived Sept. 28,
2014) ("There is no specific legal protection for whistleblowers besides the general rules
in the Federal Law on Counteracting Corruption.").
See Government to Protect Whistleblowers, Russ. LEGAL INFO. AGENCY
206.
(RAPSI) (Feb. 4, 2013, 4:45 PM), http://rapsinews.com/anticorruption-news/
20130402/266899792.html [http://perma.ccl9UEE-AVEL] (archived Sept. 14, 2014).
See OECD, supra note 205, at 23 (suggesting that "[a] comprehensive
207.
approach is ... needed to reduce overall levels of corruption in" the fields of regulation
and law enforcement).
208.
See generally id. at 10-12 (highlighting Russia's corruption as a serious
burden on business growth and recommending changes to Russia).
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disclosing information to combat wrongful government conduct. 20 9
There does not appear to be momentum for extending protections to
whistleblowers engaging in the latter.2 10
3.

Iceland

In the first article to reveal his identity as the source of the
classified intelligence information, Snowden indicated that Iceland
was his best chance for asylum. 211 Snowden's belief was apparently
derived, at least in part, from Iceland's reputation as a strong
defender of Internet freedom. 212 However, the perceived policy
alignment between Snowden and Iceland regarding open information
did not yield Snowden a favorable result. 213 From the outset,
Iceland's Ministry of Interior sidestepped the substance of the issue.
214 The Ministry's chief spokesman insisted that any asylum request
be initiated from within the country. 215 Later, the Icelandic
Parliament would decline to grant Snowden the citizenship that
would ensure his secure settlement. 216
Iceland is a signatory to both the Refugee Convention and the
Refugee Protocol. 217 The Act on Foreigners No. 96/2002, which
"appl[ies] to the right of foreigners to enter Iceland," incorporates the

209.
Cf. Yulia Krylova, The Nature of Corruption and Multilateral System of
Anti-CorruptionRegulation in the TransitionEconomy of Russia, 65 EUR. J. SCl. RES.,
79, 79-92 (2011) (noting that in the United States, economic incentives for
whistleblowing have been instrumental in detecting misconduct, both in the public and
private sector).
210.
See, e.g., id. at 88-90 (positing that even though Russia adopted new
anticorruption legislation in 2008, anticorruption efforts in Russia continue to fail due
to insufficient protection for whistleblowers and the absence of "special independent
anti-corruption agenc[ies] with authority to investigate and prosecute corruption
practices").
211.
See Greenwald, MacAskill & Poitras, supra note 7 (reporting that Snowden
considers Iceland "his best hope as the possibility of asylum").
212.
See id. (attributing his hopes for asylum in Iceland to "its reputation of
[being] a champion of internet freedom").
213.
See generally Kim Hjelmgaard, Edward Snowden Says He Seeks Safe
Harbor in Iceland, USA TODAY (June 10, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/world/2013/06/10/iceland-snowden/2407737/
[http://perma.cc/48Z6-RZJQ]
(archived Sept. 14, 2014) (explaining that asylum in Iceland was hindered by
Snowden's inability to travel there without the risk of being extradited).
214.
See id. (identifying Snowden's absence as the threshold issue).
215.
See id. ("The main stipulation for seeking asylum in Iceland would be that
the person must be in Iceland to start the process.").
216.
See Robert Robertsson, Iceland ParliamentDeclines Snowden's Citizenship
Bid, REUTERS (July 5, 2013, 3:14 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/05/ususa-security-snowden-iceland-idUSBRE9640PS20130705 [http://perma.cclB9V6-T6TQ]
(archived Sept. 14, 2014) (suggesting that Iceland's refusal to extend citizenship to
Snowden was because of its new conservative government).
217.
UNHCR, supra note 139, at 3.
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Refugee Convention's standard definition of refugee. 218 Additionally,
Article 44 extends the refugee designation to foreigners who could
experience capital punishment, torture, or other inhumane treatment
upon return to their home country. 219 Combined with Iceland's
reputation as an informational freedom advocate, this relatively
broad refugee definition suggests that Iceland should be among the
more generous nations in granting asylum applications; however,
recent statistics do not support this conclusion. 220
Even domestic law that evinces a clear state interest in openness
is ultimately meaningless to the individual unless actual procedures
implement the policy. 221 Iceland granted only 6.5 percent of its
asylum applications through roughly ten months of 2013.222 There
was a very small sample size of 137 applications for this time period,
but the result still registers beneath Russia's 7.7 percent refugee
approval.22 3
Although clearly reluctant to protect foreigners through the
asylum system, Iceland's recent history of statutory whistleblower
protections suggests a strong domestic interest in transparency. 224
On June 16, 2010, the parliament unanimously approved a proposal
for the Icelandic Modern Media Initiative (IMMI), a wide-ranging set

218.
See Act on Foreigners No. 96/2002, 2003, art. 1, 44 (Ice.), available at
[http://perma.cc/F2ENhttp://eng.innanrikisraduneyti.is/aws-and-regulations/nr/105
KG2G] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (citing Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees,
Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, art.
1(A), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137) (comparing the definition provided therein with
the definition proffered in the Refugee's Convention).
See id. arts. 44, 44a (expanding the definition of refugee beyond that which
219.
was proffered in the Refugee's Convention, thereby encompassing a wider range of
foreigners).
220.
See Vast Majority of Asylum Applications Rejected in Iceland, ICE. REV.
(Oct. 23, 2013, 4:11 PM), http://icelandreview.comlnews/2013/10/23/vast-majorityasylum-applications-rejected-iceland [http://perma.cc/TBG6-2L3V] (archived Sept. 14,
2014) (reporting that, as of October 2013, 128 out of 137 applications for asylum in
Iceland had been rejected that year).
221.
See generally id. (illustrating the disparity between Iceland's reputation as
a political safe haven and the surprisingly low percentage of applications for asylum
the country grants).
222.
See id. (reporting that, as of October 2013, only "6.5 percent of applications
for asylum in Iceland have been accepted").
223.
Compare id. (noting that Iceland only received 137 applications for
asylum), with Max Fisher, Russian Law Leaves Snowden Few Paths to Permanent
Shelter, WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
worldviews/wp/2013/08/01/russian-asylum-law-leaves-snowden-few-paths-topermanent-shelter/ [http://perma.cc/AP9C-SVFN] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) ("[Bletween
January 2007 and April 2012, 12,500 people applied for refugee status but only 961 got
it - a success rate of just 7 percent.").
224. See generally Afua Hirsch, Iceland Aims to Become a Legal Safe Have for
Journalists, GUARDAN (July 11, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/media/2010/jull
12/iceland-legal-haven-journalists-immi [http://perma.cc/HEC5-2YHF] (archived Sept.
14, 2014) (discussing the Icelandic Modern Media Initiative's push to turn Iceland into
"the equivalent of an offshore tax haven" for media freedom).
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of journalist and whistleblower protections to be implemented in
subsequent years. 225 The IMMI aims to expand the right to request
information from the government, enhance whistleblower protections,
and cultivate a friendly regulatory environment for media and their
sources. 226 Despite Iceland exhibiting a particularly ambitious public
policy favoring transparency, the extent to which it will apply this
policy in asylum determinations, and the extent to which it will
influence the international community, is yet to be determined. 227
IV. REMEDIES FOR TENSION BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND
TRANSPARENCY

The technological progress of the early twenty-first century has
enabled not only previously unimaginable intelligence-gathering
capabilities but also the capacity to instantaneously alert countries
throughout the world to the existence of such activities. This rapid
advancement inevitably presents challenges for established systems
of international and domestic law. Part IV suggests methods of coping
with the issue of unauthorized intelligence disclosures and political
asylum, and has three parts. Subpart A advocates for preventative
measures that will lower the risk of unauthorized disclosures by
removing the veil of secrecy around the information in question.
Subpart B proposes that countries ground their asylum
determinations in state interest as demonstrated through domestic
whistleblower protections. Subpart C considers the Snowden affair in
light of these proposals and concludes.
A. Preventative Measures
Maintaining secrecy in an interconnected world is a difficult task
for all people, organizations, and nations. The Snowden disclosures
illustrate that all countries, no matter their military might or
influence on world events, are susceptible to data breach. 22 8 As states

See id. (reporting that Iceland is focused on "creating a ... freedom of
225.
expression law [that] would protect journalists from . . . legal threats"); Archie Bland,
Iceland Rewrites Law to Create Haven for Investigative Reporting, INDEP., June 17,
2010, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/iceland-rewrites-law-to-create[http://perma.cc/PU8T-NABZI
haven-for-investigative-reporting-2002591.html
(archived Oct. 15, 2014) (reporting the date of IMMI passage).
226.
See Hirsch, supra note 224 (listing the seven essential aspects of IMMI's
"'modern media' plan").
227.
Cf. id. (noting that the IMMI plan faces several legal hurdles and
indicating that "even if ... [the plan] become[s] law, it remains to be seen whether the
world's major newspapers will rush to install their servers and investigative journalists
in the country.").
See, e.g., Angus West, 16 Disturbing Things Snowden Has Taught Us (So
228.
Far), GLOBAL POST (July 9, 2013), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/politics/
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continue to use and store data for national security purposes, the
growing connectivity of countries from technological advancements
renders the protection of secrets increasingly difficult. 22 9 The United
States has a strong interest in the security that surveillance
capabilities are meant to provide. However, national security may
also benefit from reducing the need for such surveillance in the first
place and increasing transparency of those capabilities that
remain. 230
1.

Diplomatic Disarmament

Greater international cooperation generally decreases the need
for intelligence gathering. Countries that work closely together on
matters of mutual interest are less likely to threaten each other's
power structures. 23 1 To do so would harm each country's cause. If the
United States feels sufficiently less threatened, the type of extensive
surveillance apparatus revealed in the wake of the Snowden
disclosures would be less useful. 232 The problem of disclosing
classified information is thus preempted, as the underlying activity
does not occur.
However, this type of diplomatic disarmament faces certain
obstacles beyond the basic notion that diplomacy suffers from
obstinate or fundamentally hostile partners. First, the issue is
complicated where there is not a formal state entity with which to
cooperate. Non-state actors play a significant role in international
affairs, and some may carry an informal power structure that makes
it difficult to build the type of close relationship necessary to support
this solution. 233 Further, states must retain the level of sovereignty
130703/edward-snowden-leaks [http://perma.cc/XC2K-CZYS] (archived Oct. 1, 2014)
(suggesting that because of Snowden's leaks, "[niew questions were raised as to
whether the U.S. intelligence community can adequately stem the current leak and
prevent future breaches from occurring" and detailing the data NSA collected on other
countries).
See Greenwald, supra note 1 (explaining that the metadata collected by the
229.
NSA "enable[s] the government to know the identity of every person with whom an
individual communicates electronically, how long they spoke, and their location at the
time of the communication"); West, supra note 228 (detailing how the U.S. government,
through the NSA, has collected data from several major American wireless carriers).
See infra Part IV.A.1-2 (illustrating how a transparency initiative could
230.
remove the advantages of cyber attacks).
See generally Kenneth W. Abbott, Enriching Rational Choice
231.
Institutionalism for the Study of International Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 5, 6 (2008)
("Institutionalists have demonstrated that relatively modest actions-such as
producing unbiased information, reducing the transactions costs of interactions,
pooling resources, monitoring state behavior, and helping to mediate disputes-can
help states achieve their goals by overcoming structural barriers to cooperation.").
232.
See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text (identifying articles that detail
the U.S. surveillance apparatus).
See Abbott, supra note 231, at 24 ("[Olne of the most significant trends in
233.
international governance is the growing role of NSAs in international institutions,
especially within the United Nations system.") (footnote omitted).
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necessary to provide for their national defense. 234 Although there will
be barriers to building trust, they are not insurmountable. States can
devise strategies to take verifiable steps toward using intelligence
information in a collaborative rather than adversarial manner.
2.

Unilateral Transparency

Openness need not be achieved through a predetermined accord,
skeptically monitoring the compliance of all countries involved. A
state may unilaterally pursue a policy of transparency, which would
have the same effect of preempting domestic disclosures. Although it
may seem foolish to risk national defense in service of an ideological
conceit, it is necessary to acknowledge the logistical realities of a
large surveillance apparatus. At least two factors suggest that
Snowden-like disclosures are increasingly likely to occur as
surveillance technology continues to expand.236 If that is the case, it
is wiser to control the dissemination of information rather than react
to unexpected leaks.
First, the Snowden disclosures confirm the massive scope of the
U.S. surveillance apparatus. While the technology is such that
relatively few individuals can oversee a particular surveillance
program without difficulty, the intelligence community as a whole
employed around 200,000 people as of September 2009.236 Such a
sprawling intelligence network provides more people the opportunity
to see or access classified information. Of course, intelligence agencies
thoroughly screen potential employees and conduct random security
audits-particularly since the Snowden affair. 237 But these
procedures are imperfect, and the chance of an individual successfully
evading them increases with a larger pool. 238

234.
See GLOBAL PRINCIPLES ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO
INFORMATION,
pmbl.
(2013)
[hereinafter
The
Tshwane
Principles],
http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/tshwane.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2014) [http://perma.cc/
R3YP-5CMH] (archived Sept. 30, 2014) ("Recognizing that states can have a legitimate
interest in withholding certain information, including on grounds of national security.")
(emphasis omitted).
See supra Part IV.A.2.
235.
See Conference Call with Dennis C. Blair, Dir. of Nat'1 Intelligence, 2009
236.
National Intelligence Strategy (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/
news/2009/09/dni091509-m.pdf [http://perma.cc/QY4Z-9G86] (archived Sept. 27, 2014)
(describing the NSA as a "200,000-person, $75 billion national enterprise in
intelligence").
237.
See Tabassum Zakaria, Exclusive: Hundreds of U.S. Security Clearances
Seen Falsified, REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2013, 9:22 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
[http://
article/2013/09/25/us-usa-security-clearances-idUSBRE98004Z20130925
perma.cc/8V9Z-VXHQ] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) ("The screening process for security
clearances has came [sic] under heightened security this year since Snowden . . . .").
238.
See generally id. (reporting that "[ftederal prosecutors have documented at
least 350 instances of faulty background investigations").
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Second, no single country has exclusive claim to advancing
technologies. As surveillance capabilities advance, so do malicious
hacking techniques. 239 Such attacks could come from many different
sources attempting to gain a strategic advantage, including
individuals, non-state actors, and other countries. 240 It is unclear
whether surveillance technologies can evolve with sufficient defensive
measures to guard against attacks. Most likely, the balance shifts as
parties compete in a technological arms race for cyber supremacy.
Such uncertainty is not a desirable national security posture. By
controlling information dissemination through a transparency
initiative, the United States would remove the potential advantage
created by a successful cyber attack.
The Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI) recently facilitated an
effort to spur such transparency initiatives by providing suggested
reforms to a government's power to rely on national security
rationales when withholding information or punishing disclosures. 2 41
Issued on June 12, 2013, The Global Principles on National Security
and the Right to Information (the Tshwane Principles) provides a
well-researched template advocating that the right to information
shall only be overcome by a national security interest in carefully
prescribed circumstances. 242 The Tshwane Principles do not call for
radical transparency, recognizing the need to keep certain types of
information classified for national and economic security reasons. 24 3
According to the OSJI's Briefing Paper on The Tshwane Principles,
three different principles establish an anti-retaliation provision for
whistleblowers and the media. 24 4 However, the whistleblower must

239.
See Ellen Nakashima, Chinese Hackers Who Breached Google Gained
Access to Sensitive Data, U.S. Officials Say, WASH. POST (May 20, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/chinese-hackers-whobreached-google-gained-access-to-sensitive-data-us-officials-say/2013/05/20/51330428be34-11e2-89c9-3be8095fe767_story.html [http://perma.cclP96M-V578] (archived Sept.
14, 2014) ("It stands to reason, [experts] said, that adversaries would be interested in
finding vulnerabilities in the networks of the companies that authorize surveillance on
behalf of the government.").
See, e.g., id. (discussing concerns about "Chinese cyberespionage" and
240.
noting the U.S. government's allegation that "[t]he Chinese ... have stolen massive
volumes of data from companies in sectors including defense, technology, aerospace,
and oil and gas").
241.
See generally The Tshwane Principles, supra note 234, pmbl. ("Desiring to
provide practical guidance to governments . . . concerning some of the most challenging
issues at the intersection of national security and the right to information .....
242.
Id. princs. 2-5.
243.
See id. pmbl. ("[S]triking the appropriate balance between the disclosure
and withholding of information is vital to a democratic society and essential for its
security, progress, development, and welfare, and the full enjoyment of human rights
and fundamental freedoms.").
244.

See Understanding the Global Principles on National Security and the

Right to Information 5 (Open Soc'y Justice Initiative, Briefing Paper, June 12, 2013),
available at http//www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/briefing-understandingtshwane-06122013%20%2Bse.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2014) [http://perma.cc/WZK6-
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act in good faith, follow applicable procedures, and only disclose an
amount of information reasonably necessary to satisfy the public
interest. 24 5 While still advancing an interest in transparency, such
affirmative requirements on the whistleblower ensure that
individuals would not be free to commit nefarious deeds for personal
gain and later obtain clemency on the technicality that there was
some disclosure involved. 246
B. Damage Control
Diplomatic disarmament and unilateral transparency do not
address the legal issue of ambiguity in the international and domestic
asylum law definitions of refugee. Even if preventative measures are
largely successful in avoiding future disclosures, some remedial
measures are necessary to address preexisting cases and instances
that fall through the cracks. 247 Snowden is one such example.
Therefore, countries should embrace domestic political asylum
determinations as an opportunity to exhibit consistency with the
policies underlying domestic whistleblower statutes. Although some
countries, such as Russia, lack any formal or functional protections
from which to draw policy, the potential availability of redress in
other jurisdictions should protect certain disclosures and deter
unlawful behavior.
A single agreement-the Refugee Convention-rests at the heart
of international asylum law. 248 Through domestic asylum
adjudications, sovereign states have the opportunity to interpret the
Refugee Convention in such a way to guide the evolution of political
asylum jurisprudence in a more stable and individualized way. 249
Some scholars have demonstrated a functional approach to
extending international asylum law jurisprudence across a range of

S39A] (archived Sept. 28, 2014) (identifying Principles 40, 43, and 46 as principles that
set forth whistleblower protections).
See id. (indicating that the Principles require that whistleblowers be
245.
protected, "provided [they] acted in good faith[,] ... followed applicable procedures[,]"
and did not "disclose[] more information than was reasonably necessary to disclose the
information of public interest").
See id. (explaining that for any whistleblower who "discloses more
246.
information than was reasonably necessary ... any punishment should be
proportionate to the harm caused").
See, e.g., Erik Laykin, The Business End of the 'Snowden Lessons', LAW360
247.
(July 19, 2013, 6:39 PM), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/458412/the-business-end-ofthe-snowden-lessons [http://perma.cc/DXP5-S4JA] (archived Sept. 27, 2014) (discussing
a variety of remedial measures that can be useful "when a disclosure or misuse
of ... information occurs").
See generally UNHCR Introductory Note, supra note 21, (stating that the
248.
Convention, at the international level, provides the most comprehensive codification of
refugee's rights).
249.
See DEP'T OF INT'L PROT., supra note 109, at 62 (indicating that individual
states are ultimately responsible for implementing the Refugee Convention).
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topics. 250 For example, the United States has recently imbued
domestic asylum determination with domestic policy by granting
asylum to victims of discrimination for sexual orientation, gender
violence, and concealment of religious belief. 251 Although these
designations do not explicitly appear in the text of the Refugee
Convention, U.S. courts have embraced the opportunity to implement
international law in a way that compensates for its perceived
deficiencies or ambiguities. 252 At least in the United States, there is a
precedent for purposive interpretations of the Refugee Convention. 253
Aside from any normative benefits to this purposive method of
implementing the Refugee Convention, it is consistent with the
historical role of asylum as an indicator of value judgments. 254
Although the prominence of political considerations varied over time,
they have factored into asylum determinations in some capacity
throughout history. 255 Because this approach encourages nations to
embrace individual state policies, there will be uneven application of
asylum law depending on the jurisdiction. 256 However, this is already
the case among signatories of the Refugee Convention. The United
States, Russia, and Iceland all experience widely varying
implementation of the Refugee Convention. 257 This approach,
therefore, benefits from consistency between reasoning and rulings
and allows flexibility for individual states. The influence of

250.
See, e.g., William Thomas Worster, The Evolving Definition of the Refugee
in Contemporary Asylum Law, 30 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 94, 104 (2012) (discussing the
role international law concerning asylum plays in the changing definition of refugee).
251.
See Leonard Birdsong, "Give Me Your Gays, Your Lesbians, and Your
Victims of Gender Violence, Yearning to Breathe Free of Sexual Persecution . . . The
New Grounds for Grants of Asylum, 32 NOVA L. REV. 357, 389 (2008) (suggesting that
the expanded basis upon which asylum could be granted stemmed from the belief that
even people fleeing persecution for things like sexual identity have basic human
rights); Peter J. Smith, Note, Suffering in Silence: Asylum Law and the Concealment of
Political Opinion as a Form of Persecution, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1021, 1031 (2012)
("[C]ourts generally have been unwilling to deny asylum applications when the
applicant could avoid persecution by concealing his or her beliefs.").
252.
See, e.g., Birdsong, supra note 251, at 375-78 (describing the development
of U.S. case law that broadened the definition of "a particular social group" to provide
asylum to persons persecuted for their sexual orientation); Smith, supra note 251, at
1031-33 (providing examples of cases where U.S. courts have gone above and beyond
the requirements of international law in offering asylum to victims of religious
persecution).
253.
See Worster, supra note 250, at 132-33 (noting that the interpretation of
the Convention has been "dynamic and human-oriented").
254.
See PRICE, supra note 23, at 57 (describing how a focus on "political
morality" in asylum determinations is consistent with asylum's historical origins).
255.
See generally id. at 24-58 (discussing the influence of political
considerations on asylum since the early Greek period).
256.
See generally id. (arguing that historically, the political considerations
attached to asylum determinations resulted in inconsistent applications of asylum
law).
257.
See supra Part III.B.1-3 (outlining the various Convention implementation
strategies employed in the United States, Russia, and Iceland).
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jurisdictions exhibiting strong policy for transparency should mitigate
the uneven application of whistleblower policy in asylum over time. 258

C. Application to Snowden
For Snowden's claim to succeed under the Refugee Convention,
he must argue that his charged crimes-particularly the Espionage
Act violations for the unauthorized and willful communication of
classified intelligence information to unauthorized parties-are
sufficiently political and that the fear he would suffer from
persecution as a result of membership in a protected class upon
return to the United States is well-founded. 259 As established in the
discussion on modern asylum law, these issues are not consistently
resolved across jurisdictions. 260
With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible that the United
States could have preempted the disclosures in accord with the goals
of this Note's proposals regarding preventative measures. 261 In this
case, whether unilateral transparency could have avoided Snowden's
disclosures depends on the nature of the information included in the
initiative. Although one may assume that there existed a level of
surveillance activity under which Snowden would not have revealed
information, the precise tipping point is entirely speculative. 262
Further, diplomatic disarmament through enhanced cooperation
between states on the basis of mutual interest would likely not have
been sufficient in Snowden's case. 263 Because the disclosed
surveillance operations included so many different countries, it is
unreasonable to assume that the United States would have been able
to reach the required trust level with all of them to make diplomatic
disarmament a viable approach. 264

See Simon Wolfe et. al, Whistleblower Protection Rules in G20 Countries:
258.
The Next Action Plan 10-11 (Public Consultation Draft, June 2014) (indicating that
most international organizations and governmental anticorruption agencies have
incorporated whistleblowing into their anticorruption, pro-transparency programs
because of its proven effectiveness in diminishing those issues).
See Refugee Convention, supra note 110, art. I(A)(2) (stipulating that "the
259.
term 'refugee' . . . appl[ies] to any person who . .. owing to well-founded fear of being

persecuted" cannot return to "the country of his nationality"); Finn & Horwitz, supra
note 10 (noting that "[flederal prosecutors have filed a criminal complaint against
Edward Snowden" that charges Snowden "with theft, 'unauthorized communication of
national defense information' and 'willful communication of classified communications
intelligence information to an unauthorized person"').
260.
See supra Part III.A (discussing the lack of a uniform definition of political
persecution).
261.
See supra Part IV.A.1-2 (advocating for measures to reduce the tension
between sovereignty and transparency such as diplomatic disarmament and unilateral
transparency).
262.
See, e.g., Mark Felsenthal, Obama: US Needs Checks on NSA Data
Gathering But Can't Disarm, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2013, 5:45 PM), http://www
.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-usa-surveillance-obama-idUSBRE9BJ19L20131220
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Assuming that preventative measures would not have preempted
Snowden's disclosures, his likelihood of success under Part IV.B's
method of grounding domestic asylum determinations in a statespecific purposive reading of the Refugee Convention would, by
necessity, depend on the jurisdiction. 265 The three countries analyzed
in Part III.B would produce three different results depending on the
strength of their domestic whistleblower protections. Russia, without
any whistleblower statute on which to base a state interest, would
firmly deny Snowden asylum. 266 To the extent that the IMMI
represents a very strong state interest in transparency, Iceland would
likely grant asylum. 267 Ignoring for a moment that the United States
is Snowden's home country and the focus of the disclosures, the result
is less clear. While there are numerous statutes establishing
whistleblower protections in the United States, they have been
historically ineffective. 268 SOX, Dodd-Frank, and the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 may indicate a grant of
asylum, but the corporate nature or uncertain implementation of
those statutes is a complicating factor. 269
This Note's approach is ultimately prescriptive, not predictive. It
offers a general framework for resolving ambiguities in international
and domestic asylum law by allowing significant flexibility to the
adjudicating country. Although there would be variance among
individual cases, the general trend would reveal the domestic state's
policy preference over time, providing states incentive to increase
transparency by encouraging the disclosure of wrongful behavior.
Jacob Stafford*
[http://perma.cc/4LPW-62LQ] (archived Sept. 14, 2014) (reporting that President
Obama acknowledged that some checks on U.S. surveillance practices are necessary,
but stated "we can't unilaterally disarm").
263.
See id. (noting Obama's opinion that Snowden's actions caused
unnecessary damage" to U.S. diplomacy and made America vulnerable to other
countries that are interested in disparaging U.S. policies).
264.
See supra Part IV.A.1 (highlighting the inherent difficulties impeding the
viability of diplomatic disarmament).
265.
See DEP'T OF INT'L PROT., supra note 109, at 62 (indicating that individual
states are ultimately responsible for determining who qualifies as a refugee within
their borders).
266.
See supra Part III.B.2 (highlighting the lack of specific whistleblower
protections in Russian law).
267.
See supra Part III.B.3 (suggesting that Iceland's recent history of statutory
whistleblower protections indicates a strong interest in transparency).
268.
See supra Part III.B.1 (explaining that the focus on whistleblower
protections in the United States tends to be on anti-retaliation measures and not
remedies).
269.
See supra Part III.B.1 (acknowledging that SOX and Dodd-Frank support
and incentivize private-sector corporate whistleblowers).
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Vanderbilt University Law School; B.A. 2008, East
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